• TWO NEW DOUBTS ABOUT SIMULATION ARGUMENTS

  • Sep 21 2024
  • Length: 9 mins
  • Podcast

TWO NEW DOUBTS ABOUT SIMULATION ARGUMENTS

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  • Summary

  • Today’s article (Two New Doubts About Simulation Arguments) challenges the popular simulation argument, the idea that we may be living in a computer simulation. The authors, Summers and Arvan, argue that the simulation hypothesis is unlikely to be true if panpsychism or panqualityism is true. These views hold that consciousness or qualities (like colors) are fundamental to reality.


    The authors argue that if either of these views is true, then digital simulations may not be able to replicate conscious experiences, and that the only way we could be in a simulation is as brains-in-vats.


    They contend that the simulation hypothesis, even if true, would be a sceptical scenario as we would be unable to distinguish the real world from the simulated one, and that the simulation argument is unlikely to be a valid explanation for fundamental physics.
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Philosophy Social Sciences
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